Can people counteract biased narratives with subsequent information? Using an online experiment where counteracting may have the best odds by design, we investigate this question by first randomly assigning subjects to read different narratives that contain the same facts, and then offering them the opportunity to acquire and process balanced arguments. We document three main findings. First, subjects shift their attitudes towards the standpoint of the randomly assigned narrative, knowing that the narrative is slanted and randomly assigned. Second, the opportunity to read additional arguments does not prompt subjects to counteract the persuasion effects of the initial narratives. Third, when evaluating subsequent arguments, participants find arguments aligned with the randomly assigned narrative more convincing. These findings remain qualitatively similar in additional treatments where the balanced arguments are provided two weeks after initial exposure to narratives. Only when we replace these arguments with the exact opposing narratives that subjects do not initially see are they able to fully counteract the effects. Taken together, our results highlight the importance of balanced and complete exposure at the outset in counteracting the influence of biased narratives.

Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a collective choice. This experimental study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in self-governance via institutional design in a social dilemma. Groups decide repeatedly on whether to establish any institution, and if so which institutions, to sustain cooperation in a public goods game. We hypothesize that collective-choice rules may directly affect cooperation, conditional on having the same institutions. They may also have an indirect effect on cooperation, via institutional choices. We implement three collective-choice rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. Our main findings are: (1) cooperation level is not higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule. (2) Institutional choices made via majority voting or a fixed dictator are more stable over time than those chosen by rotating dictators. (3) The instability of institutions is associated with lower cooperation level. These results have implications for the organization of small-scale group-decision.

Moral judgments are important factors in individual decision-making and interpersonal interactions. I examine the relativity of moral judgments, specifically, whether moral judgments toward a decision maker depend on the reference decision maker’s choice. The results of an experiment show that people punish a decision maker who chooses an immoral action more harshly when they observe another moral choice than if they observe another immoral one. A contrast effect, rather than a shift in perceived social norms, accounts for the relativity. The relativity of moral judgments suggests that there exists non-monetary spillover effects of one’s action on another. The results have implications for moral behavior in markets and in other social contexts.